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Der Artikel untersucht Möglichkeiten eines öko-solidarischen Entwicklungsmodells für Europa 
unter Rückgriff auf lateinamerikanische Theorien und Erfahrungen. Die Argumentation erfolgt 
gemäß des didaktischen Dreischritts von Ist-Soll-Tun. In einem ersten Schritt wird die spezifisch 
dysfunktionale neoliberale Regulation in Europa analysiert, die Chancen für emanzipatorische 
Strategien eröffnet. In einem zweiten Schritt wird das gute Leben für alle als konkrete Utopie 
vorgestellt, die aus Lateinamerika inspiriert ist. Diese Utopie polarisiert Bewegungen, Klassen 
und Lösungsansätze vor allem dann, wenn es um die Entscheidung geht, ob das gute Leben „für 
wenige“ oder „für alle“ verwirklicht werden soll. In einem dritten Schritt werden die 
Herausforderungen für eine pluralistische Suchbewegung, die eine große Transformation 
umsetzen soll, untersucht. 
 
This working paper analyses the potentialities of an eco-solidarian development model for 
Europe by mobilising theories and experiences from Latin America. The argument is based on a 
didactical analysis in three parts: Is-Shall-Do. In a first step, the dysfunctional neoliberal 
regulation in Europe will be analysed. In a second step, the good life for all is presented as a 
concrete utopia, inspired from Latin America. This utopia polarizes movement, classes und 
proposals especially with respect to a decision on whether the good life shall be realized „for the 
few“ or „for all“. In a third step, the challenges for a pluralistic search movement to implement 





It will not have slipped attentive observers’ minds that over the past few years the good life is 
increasingly being talked about. Examples of a successful life and philosophical reflections on a 
way of life beyond ‘more-and-more’ or ‘faster-and-faster’ can not only be found in lifestyle-
magazines but also in the feature pages. One finds the good life as a political slogan in diverse 
organizations such as Attac, the Grüne Bildungswerkstatt (Austrian Green Foundation), IG 
Metall, the german metalworkers union, and feminist groups (Knecht et al. 2013). Is the interest 
in the good life merely fashionable or does this concept open up new opportunities for a search 
movement that does not only offer alternatives to neoliberalism, but leads - in the long run - the 
way to a (wholly) different society? 
The text at hand explores this very issue and offers, learning from Latin American experiences 
and theories, perspectives for society-changing action in Europe. This takes the form of the 
didactic triad of "Is-Should-Acting” (Boff 1984; Novy/Lengauer 2008): A focused analysis of the 
current political-economic situation (Section 1) and a concrete utopia (Section 2) represent the 
starting point for political strategies presented in Section 3 (Fiori 1995: 11ff; Novy 2000; Jessop 
2007: 133). I see a good life for all as a "real possibility in history" (Bloch 1959: 285), something 
that can be achieved. It is an idea with a past, present and future, which identifies "a tomorrow 
today"1 (Bloch 1959: 1627). It can drive a European model of development in the 21st century, 
when it comes to an environmentally sensitive transformation of European welfare capitalism 
(Novy 2012). 
 
 1. Neoliberalism’s dysfunctionality as an opportunity 
 
My economic analysis is based on the admittedly quite optimistic assumption that neo-liberalism 
is doomed to fail. In my opinion, it is doomed to fail because it is inferior to other forms of 
capitalism, especially to reactionary and progressive forms of state capitalism. Capitalism is 
certainly no moral economy and far from able to provide a good life for all. Capitalism derives its 
power from the constant effort to make man and nature further utilizable -that is to “turn into 
                                                 
1 In German: „das Morgen im Heute” 
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money”. It is this separation of economic value and moral assessment, of exchange value and 
use-value as well as the social and natural metabolism, which is essential to the impressive 
capitalist progress of material wealth and individual freedom. Especially if we want to overcome 
this socioeconomic system we cannot underestimate capitalism’s capability for progress – also in 
the context of a better life. Too often capitalist development drew its dynamics from 
mephistophelian power, which always pursues Evil yet also creates Good. However, the priorities 
are clear: as long as the circuit of capital doesn’t bulk, hunger and climate change are no spanner 
in the works of a class society, which “resolves” possible defects by increasing the number of the 
excluded. This also represents the misperception of environmental economists of the North, who 
take no account of the underlying power relations in current resource consumption: For some 
time we can still maintain our lifestyle as long as enough others can be excluded. Yet this is 
exactly what emerging economies of the Global South are no longer willing to accept. 
Yet, in the long run capital tends to undermine its own systemic foundations and to become self-
destructive in the absence of systemic limitations. Economies in general and thus also capitalism 
require social embedding and social regulation. For Karl Polanyi (1978) it is the unleashed 
market forces that have been embedded by fascism, communism and reformist policy in the 
1930s. For John Maynard Keynes it is the financial- and rentier-capitalism that must be limited 
by state regulations. Marx goes one step further in his critique of the mode of production that 
leads to privatized accumulation of collectively produced value-added. He sees the need for a 
transformation that does not present a step backwards to the old ways of embedding, but a step 
forward towards a society of the free and equal. 
For years, Critics of Neoliberalism (Brenner et al. 2005; Theodore/Peck 2012) have pointed to 
the ideological flexibility and political opportunism of neoliberal governance. Therefore, they 
speak of neoliberalization as a process of continued crisis management instead of neo-liberalism 
as a free-trading, market-friendly and anti-state theoretical structure. Despite its flexibility 
neoliberalism proves incapable of establishing social and territorial cohesion and thus (incapable 
of establishing) a "spatial fix" (Harvey 1985). There is a lack of coherence of short- and long-
term and private and public decisions. With declining purchasing power in the domestic market, 
falling profitability of long-term investments and decreasing international competitiveness, 
neoliberalism undermines the systemic foundations of accumulation. In this, neoliberalism is no 
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different from the "unleashed" liberal capitalism before 1929: "We have always known that 
heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics. Out of the collapse 
of a prosperity whose builders boasted their practicality has come the conviction that in the long 
run economic morality pays" (Roosevelt 1937). Even within capitalism neoliberalism is "bad 
economics" - which manifested not only in the 1920s, but again in the wake of the neoliberal 
structural-adjustment-policies in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. In order to prevent the 
depreciation of the national currency and therefore securing assets, stagnation generating 
measures - like in Brazil until 1998 and in Argentina until 2001 – are needed: high interest rates, 
a decrease in imports or a reduction of wages and government spending. However, the related 
reduction of purchasing power lowers tax revenues – and thus neoliberal austerity policy usually 
leads to rising budget deficits. Foreign trade imbalances, loss of market share and recession with 
all the associated human suffering follow. 
In the 1990s Latin America was suffering from a hangover. The election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 
marked a turning point. Subsequently reformist governments came into power in many countries 
and strengthened the internal market, stabilized national sovereignty over natural resources and 
expanded social services. These measures boosted economic growth, facilitated fiscal 
consolidation and reduced the foreign-trade and financial dependencies, but also exacerbated 
ecological conflicts via neo-extractivist policies (Novy 2008). In times of so-called globalization, 
the new rulers realized - supported by rising commodity prices - an embedding of unleashed 
market powers which was superior to neoliberal capitalism even in respect to those indicators that 
neoliberals like to compete in: economic growth, competitiveness and national debt. 
Europe, however, suffers from its policy model of European Governance – a globally unique 
form of shared sovereignty between the Member States and the European institutions. European 
nation-states are still economically significant on a global scale but are provinces in geographic 
and demographic terms. Additionally it makes policies of more self-reliant development difficult 
- the respective production systems and financial capital interlocking go far beyond the narrow 
national boundaries (cf. Becker et al. 2013). Best case for Europe is the constitution - by way of 
Multi-level Governance (Hooge/Marks 2010) - of a polity organized on several levels that allows 
for context-adapted economic activity and living. In fact, there is ‘Kompetenzwirrwarr’ 
(confusion of responsibilities) - caused by a "scalar mismatch" (Martinelli/Novy 2013: 311f) - 
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that makes political action more difficult: central monetary policy and fiscal rules, decentralized 
allocation of funds and national social- and environmental-policy. No territory in the world is as 
permanently and as negatively affected by the 2008-crisis as Europe. While the neoliberal 
strategy has (originally) deliberately served the erosion of the room for policy-making 
(Apeldoorn et al. 2009) at first, we are currently observing a paralysis that even makes the EU's 
disintegration seem possible (Krastev 2013). 
While the crisis after 1929 was a systemic crisis, but one that preserved the hegemony of North 
Atlantic capitalism, the current crisis does not only unsettle the politico-economic (dominance) 
but also the centuries-long cultural dominance of the West. For Europe, this is new, since 
European capitalism has benefited from its outer-orientation (proselytization, colonization) and a 
policy of free - albeit always selective - trade (classical imperialism or modern forms of Good 
Governance) for more than 500 years. Over the past three decades however the continued 
weakening of both the industrial base and the mass purchasing power – that has begun with 
Margaret Thatcher - has sustainably undermined Europe’s competitiveness and advanced the rise 
of Asia (UNDP 2013). 
Without going into detail about the assessment of China's development path (Arrighi 2008; 
Dunford/Yeung 2010), the dynamics of peripheral-capitalist development and the erosion of 
Western hegemony seems to continue unabated (Arrighi 2005a, 2005b). Nowadays there is the 
aim in the emerging and the Latin American countries to steer social and economic development 
by stronger government control. Domestic markets are growing, while they are shrinking in 
Europe. Infrastructures are being expanded, while in Europe public investment is being reduced. 
By now this also affects key industries such as software and automotive industries whose 
production and sales are increasingly being relocated. If the European and US-American 
capitalism of today were similarly dominant worldwide as in the 1930s, a deep global depression 
would be likely. But because the Global South is currently changing the centuries-old hierarchy 
of center and periphery (UNDP 2013: 13) the recession in the North continues - without tipping 
into a global crisis. 
I do not see a final crisis of capitalism, but certainly a deep, perhaps final exhaustion of European 
capitalism. A wider range of demographic groups and capital fractions can sense the neoliberal 
dysfunctions. The deepening of the European Single Market has above all strengthened the 
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economic power of the centers, especially Germany’s, but also Austria’s. Pre-2008 the one’s 
"export miracle" largely corresponded to the other’s “import frenzy”. Now one can observe that 
the decline in purchasing power at the periphery affects the export economy of the center. Thus, 
it is expected that the uneven development in the entire European production system, i.e. 
including the export-oriented center-economies, will lead to destructive dynamics. Not only large 
parts of the middle and lower classes in all parts of Europe, but also smaller businesses that 
primarily focus on local and national markets and also suffer from difficult credit-access, have a 
vested interest in a change of course. 
This leads to increasingly polarized strategies. For one thing, there are the answers of the right, 
for which the solution is to accept or even aim at an exclusion of certain population groups and 
territories. The neoliberal mainstream model is operated by a faction which legitimizes itself in a 
cosmopolitian way. A faction concerned with creating a European area of power that divests 
economic policies of democratic decision (Krastev 2013). This centralized European competition 
project will ensure its resource-requirements with the help of state-like structures, and if 
necessary with the help of the military. Withal it is accepted that patterns of unequal development 
and dependence within Europe are being reinforced. Protagonists of this faction are European 
Commission Vice-President Olli Rehn and the President of the European Central Bank Mario 
Draghi as well as the majority of current national heads of government. Since neoliberalism 
dysfunctionally undermines its own foundations - in particular social cohesion - a right-
authoritarian model has developed in recent years. Hungary's Prime Minister Victor Orban relies 
on the classic concept of territory of a strong nation-state, which enforces its interests against 
international banks and corporations and simultaneously administers social cohesion by 
differentiation from ‘welfare scroungers’, Roma and dissidents. Depending on the 
appropriateness either neoliberal or Keynesian policy elements are adopted. 
For another thing, there is the European left with its three groupings. The largest faction is the 
reformist, eco-keynesian movement, basically consisting of Social Democrats, the Greens and the 
majority of the cosmopolitical-minded intellectuals who focus on ecological modernization and 
forms of green growth. Democracy, social welfare and ecological policies are supposed to be 
Europeanized. The second, also party-politically organized faction is a Eurosceptic, more statist 
and pro-welfare state left (Dutch socialists, various Communist parties). The third faction 
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comprises a motion-oriented and libertarian-state-critical movement, which strives for 
fundamental changes in the mode of production and way of life that go beyond capitalism and in 
the process also draw on traditional concepts such as the Commons. 
These groupings are more or less isolated environments with little common tactical and strategic 
objectives. A solidarity-ecological model of the good life for all based on care and attentiveness 
could in my view be the foundation for a cross-milieu utopia. An utopia that can provide 
orientation to both; those who strive for improvements in the existing, as well as those who want 
to evolve beyond ongoing capitalistic valorisation and (beyond) a way of life that is geared to 
acceleration and expansion. 
 
 2. A good life for all 
 
In order to become potent each utopia needs to build on specific traditions and achievements, and 
has to identify the potential of the existing that goes beyond the currently available (Hartwig 
2007). For many in Andean America this combination of tradition and potential, this concrete 
utopia is buen vivir; in Europe - as I will argue - it is the democratic welfare state. There and here 
the "working, the creating individual, reshaping and overhauling his/her surrounding"2 becomes 
an actor, who "realizes in the future, what shines into everybody’s childhood and where no man 
has been: home"3 (Bloch 1959: 1628). The good life for all is not just about a shift in emphasis 
from having to being, but about a collective strategy of becoming and thus the development of 
the potential for a life as long, as creative, as healthy and as successful as possible for all. Such 
strategies differ from place to place and do not only require creativity and organization but also 
collective action. In Latin America, the resistance against exclusion culminated in political 
alliances and new social majorities. In Europe, the political left is disoriented, not at least because 
there is no consensus on the objectives. I suggest both as a short and long-term goal to realize the 
opportunities based in the 20th century’s welfare state. In my judgement in today’s Europe it is 
                                                 
2 In German: “arbeitende, schaffende, die Gegebenheiten umbildende und überholende Mensch” 
3 In German: “in der Zukunft verwirklicht, das allen in die Kindheit scheint und worin noch 
niemand war: Heimat” 
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about the defense and advancement of democracy and the welfare state, based on the insight that 
we are (on the verge of) losing something important (Judt 2010: 221). 
 2.1 Good Life 
Striving for a successful life inspired thinking about economy and society in all cultures. In 
continuing Elisabeth Schmid’s (2013)considerations. I am mainly interested in two cultures. In 
Europe, the debate revolves about the fundamental question of a successful life: What are 
"standards and criteria of a successful life" (Rosa, 2009: 90)? How much is enough 
(Skidelsky/Skidelsky 2012)? How can a good life be made possible? (Colson/Fickett 2005)? 
Here, occidental-enlightened thought references Aristotle, whose ideas were picked up by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and which - in contrast to ideas of liberalism - assume a 
"substantive conception of the good": People are only equal in the respect that, "if the life of each 
is viewed with imagination and if as a result each individual receives what he or she needs to be 
able to lead a rich and in the fullest sense human life, to the extent permitted by the natural ways" 
(Nussbaum 1999: 45). Nussbaum (1999: 49-58) starts from the "constitutive conditions of the 
human being" such as mortality, hunger and connectedness with other humans. Sen’s capabilities 
approach is guided by the possibility of self-development and the empowerment to freely shape 
one's own life - that is, being able to choose (Sen 1999). In modern societies, it is about the good 
life of the individual, about "autonomy and authenticity, the ability to remain true to oneself" 
(Rosa 2009: 95), which advances private interpretations of the good life. However, western 
individualism developed in a civilization characterized by sharp class hierarchies. Therefore, a 
few have always had the privilege to live - according to the respective state of development - a 
good life. But this privatized good life for an elite only, leads to social conflict between the 
privileged and the mass, which - as shown by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2010) - also 
diminishes the quality of life of the beneficiaries. A good life for all, however, requires vision of 
social cohesion and environmental embedding, from which certain lifestyles and production 
methods are promoted and others are prevented (Skidelsky/Skidelsky 2012: 193). 
What is therefore of particular importance for the current debates is the concept of the good life 
originating in Latin America - in Spanish buen vivir and sumak kawsay in Quechua (Fatheuer 
2011: 11; see also Schmid (2013)). This is a cosmovision, a holistic, human- and nature- 
comprising worldview whose representatives understand it as a counter-concept to the Western-
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dominated concept of development (Gudynas 2012). Buen vivir usually presents itself as a 
negation, as a departure from all that development has brought to date (Acosta 2013). On this 
reading development would be equated with capitalist progress, faith in technology and cultural 
unification of Western-style blank cut (Escobar 2008). Development and modernization - 
embodied in road construction, power plants and mining projects - would therefore be the 
opposite of buen vivir. "Buen Vivir is sharply delimited from the idea of individual good life. It is 
only conceivable in a social context, mediated by the community in which people live" (Fatheuer 
2011: 20, emphasis in original). By emphazising the dark side of materialistic modernization and 
fragmented individualization buen vivir guides the resistance of the strongly indigenously 
influenced, often rural population and its associated social movements against neoliberal 
capitalism. 
Although the approach of buen vivir remains unclear concerning specific strategies of transition 
from neoliberalism to the good life, for me this utopia impresses by its bottom-up approach. A 
bottom-up approach feeding on collective experiences and struggles, impresses by a holistic and 
ecological point of view as a corrective to Western individualism and by its explicit contextual 
approach - three aspects which are also important for European utopia designs, without those 
simply being copied. 
 2.2 For all 
Norberto Bobbio has proposed a simple distinction between left and right: The right stands for 
freedom, the left for equality, more precisely for the equal freedom of all and therefore for 
putting emphasis on the importance of social rights in addition to the traditional rights of freedom 
(Bobbio 1994: 82). This is not only reminiscent of Sen’s concept but also of considerations of 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1986: 69) of the "free development of each being the condition 
for the free development of all." The core of the good life for all thus constitutes the link between 
freedom and equality – ‘Gleichfreiheit’ (equal freedom) (Balibar 1993) or, put differently 
freedom for all (Lipietz 1998). 
The motto of the government Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was Brasil para todos - Brazil for all. For 
Lula it was not about more and not about less than for European social democracy in the 20th 
century: to allow all, and not just a privileged part of the population the hedge against the risks of 
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life and the participation in capitalist consumer society. Brazil's governments of the past ten 
years, just like most other reformist governments of Latin America, pursue a policy of inclusion. 
Regardless of a sometimes radical rhetoric it is about state capitalism - about a better form of 
capitalist accumulation. This constitutes a continuation of an environmentally alarming policy of 
extractivism and does not exclude that a "happy bourgeoisie" - in line with Gosta Esping-
Anderson's analysis of Swedish development - persists (Esping-Andersen, n.y.). A part of 
entrepreneurs benefit greatly from this policy - but so does the emerging middle class and 
especially low-paid earners (Pochmann 2012). In contrast to the trend in rich countries, income 
inequality decreased significantly across the continent (OECD 2011; Cornia 2012). The core of a 
policy "for all" is the creation of dignity of those who were excluded until recently and enabling a 
comprehensive form of cidadania (citizenship), which leads to participation in society that goes 
beyond voting. But at the same time Lulismo (Singer 2009) tries to create win-win situations and 
thus to prevent polarization and radicalization of the political right. 
In accordance with the definitions of the good life given above, the policy models in Latin 
America that aim for a good life for all, for me are not limited to the Andes region, where the 
connection to nature is more pronounced than in more urban Latin America. The objective of 
Brazil’s President Lula to facilitate three meals a day for all, also falls within this model just as 
the Venezuelan Chávez’ government’s literacy programs. Lula and Chávez differed in their 
choice of words, their tactics and strategies. What they had in common, was that they came from 
a humble background, were self-taught, represented the poor and - just like European social 
democracy - regarded environmental issues as secondary. Yet they succeeded in areas that Latin 
American structuralists consider as preconditions for independent development (Fischer 2013): A 
social policy - by now even undisputed amongst critics - that strengthens the internal market and 
expands the scope of action in the national productive system. In Chávez’ case by government 
control over the key sector oil, in the case of Lula by the expansion of infrastructure and 
rudiments of an independent industrialization. Although their reforms improved life chances of 
many - allegedly impossible in times of "post-democracy" (Crouch 2004) - both models are not 
without contradictions and are fragile, as we have seen in particular after Chávez’ death and as 
mass protests in Brazil during the Confederation-Cups 2013 have demonstrated. 
 12 
 
What is being criticized particularly harshly by the international civil society and the radical left 
edge of the Latin American political spectrum, is the reformist governments’ environmental 
policy. The unexpected dynamic rise of the Latin American development state has increased the 
perverse effects of motorization and uncontrolled real estate business in the cities. In turn, in the 
country, the conflicts intensify over dams, rail- and road-projects and the ecological devastation 
caused by mining and monocultures. All this encourages ecological criticism and turns the 
Andean buen vivir into a ‘Realutopie’ (real utopia) of a post-growth-society for parts of the 
global justice movement and the environmental movement. Its representatives ask about the sense 
in fairly distributing a cake that is spoiled. If higher salaries are immediately spent at the pumps, 
aren’t wage freezes better for the climate? Thus growth critique is simultaneously a critique of 
progress and of civilization, of mass culture and of consumerism (Jackson 2009). In fact, 
European consumerism is neither ecologically sustainable nor compatible with global justice, 
because car ownership and long-distance travel is not possible for all seven billion inhabitants of 
the planet. However, a further essential quality of European lifestyle that was picked up by 
reformist governments, results from a public sector that improves life chances and is organized 
outside of short-term capitalist exploitation interests: good and free education, health care and 
old-age provision for all. The following section generalizes the antagonism central to the Latin 
American argument - the antagonism of the good life for all and neoliberalism. 
 2.3 Polanyi or Hayek? 
Karl Polanyi (1978) criticized the destructive dynamics of a market society in which the social 
and environmental livelihoods are being destroyed by free markets. He set his hope on the re-
embedding of economic processes by reformist policy. For Friedrich August von Hayek (1978) 
neoliberalism serves the establishment of a "Constitution of Liberty" that stabilizes the status quo 
of political and economic power. In practice the choice of means was quite opportunistic ever 
since the 1970s: If required - as in Chile under Augusto Pinochet - dictatorial, in other cases by 
market-friendly regulations, or bank bail-out- and industrial-subsidy-programs. For David Harvey 
(2005) neoliberalism is an ideological "class struggle from above". As a political project, it is 
above all directed against something: against a society that is humane and just and shaped by 
individuals in a given territory as it was first implemented in local experiments and then, after 
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WWII, on a grand scale as welfare capitalism in the North and as national development state in 
the South. 
Both Karl Polanyi and Friedrich August von Hayek were impressed by the Red Vienna of the 
1920s - for the one as an example of an embedding of economic processes, for the other as a step 
towards serfdom (Peck, 2008: 9). And how do we deal with Red Vienna and the welfare state as 
attempts to provide a good life for all? Are they central historical benchmarks, positive 
references? For the right, be it the right-authoritarian variant or the neoliberal mainstream, the 
answer is clear: their project is only for the few. The left however, is strangely ambivalent, as I 
want to show by way of example on the basis of the ‘Journal für Entwicklungspolitik’ (Journal of 
Development Studies) 3/2012 - which is also dedicated to the theme of transformation. For 
instance, there is a clear commitment to development and the welfare state in Birgit Daiber’s 
(2012: 15) text: "Making development possible requires a welfare state, a democratic state under 
the rule of law that is functional and powerful, and provides legal and civic security as well as 
access to the vital goods and services for the population." Daiber thus sets the framework for a 
socio-ecological transformation towards a good life for all, which distinguishes itself from right 
approaches of authoritarianism, exclusion and privatization. However, other texts of the booklet 
remain silent on the successes of the fight against poverty and the beginning construction of 
welfare- and development-state structures in Latin America. Rather, those texts spot excessive 
‘Staatszentrierung’ (state centering) of the traditional left, a blinding out of environmental 
problems and detect a "developmental illusion" (Svampa 2012: 52). Maristella Svampa (2012: 
56) therefore sympathizes with a third path that equally rejects both the neoliberal and neo-
developmentalist "Commodities Consensus" (Svampa 2012: 55). Edgardo Lander (2012: 76) 
affirmatively refers to Walter Mignolos distinction between "the left, the right, and the 
decolonial". After a thorough critique of left realpolitik by Latin American authors, it remains 
unclear whether right and left are still relevant categories. Ulrich Brand’s (2012a) final remarks 
also remain abstract. This is not surprising, since he explicitly dissociates himself from the 
concept of "green socialism" (Candeias 2012), because it doesn’t sufficiently expose the 
problems of the welfare state and Fordism (Brand 2012b: 115). Brand speaks of the 
American/European way of life as an "oligarchical mode of living" (Brand 2012a: 130) or the 
"imperial way of life" (Brand 2012a: 131), in order to address in what way power relations can be 
 14 
 
found in lifestyles. The uneven development of center and periphery that Latin American 
structuralism and dependency theory deal with in detail (Fischer 2013) is also expressed in 
certain ways of life. Yet the concept of the "imperial way of life" lacks relationship to its imperial 
mode of production, meaning to the capitalist world economy with its current dynamics that is 
also turning Europeans into losers. In all countries of the world some individuals are living 
"imperial" - that is living "beyond their means." In Europe, where achievements are eroding, 
fears of social decline become reality and neoliberal decision-makers are again creating a society 
“for the few”, the concept of an "imperial way of life" increasingly seems "fora do lugar" 
(Cardoso 1993), meaning out of place. Because if it is in fact - for the purposes of a critique of a 
"labor aristocracy in the centers" - directed at the European middle and lower classes, it either 
produces a guilty conscience because of complicity or it reinforces those conservative 
environmental economists who think that all Europeans have to tighten their belts. If one wants to 
address imperial relations of exploitation, the concept would have to connect - learning from 
Latin America - to the strands of theory discussed in this issue and conduct an analysis of the 
actual political situation. So it is important - amongst all internal conflicts and cleavages within 
the left - not to forget that the harshest and most powerful critics of reformist governments are - 
not surprisingly - coming from the right: US foreign policy is funding the opposition, the media 
are criticizing the government and in Honduras and Paraguay coups were already successful. On 
the ground it is a powerful alliance of traditional actors - especially the media, agricultural 
oligarchy, financial capital, asset owners and an established middle class, with distinct pride of 
place – that again wants to limit development for a few. The media’s strategy of splitting is based 
on the continuous double message, that on the one hand they put reformist governments in the 
vicinity of authoritarian statism and on the other hand criticize that they have allegedly adapted to 
the existing corrupt neoliberal system.  
Although reformist policy in Latin America questions the basic structure of capitalist societies 
only marginally - e.g. in relation to the control of natural resources and attempts at strengthening 
a public banking system - it still encounters fierce and systematic opposition of the elite(s). With 
this Latin America's left is still a giant stride ahead of Europe’s. In Europe it even lacks a 
coherent alliance against neoliberal policies, let alone a political movement for a great 
transformation. In the following concluding chapter a good life not for the few, but for all is 
 15 
 
proposed as an utopian horizon, which can offer guidance to all those who want to participate in 
such an ecologically-solidarity search movement. 
 
 3. A good life for all: From a search movement to a hegemonic project 
 
The debate on who can live well in Europe, has long been contested. Over here, in the 20th 
century, the labor movement has achieved participation in the existing system for the vast 
majority. Red Vienna and many other experiments at local and national level are part of this story 
of social progress. In the 21st century, a further step will be necessary - one that is both more 
courageous and at the same time more humble: It is necessary to organize the good life for all in a 
way that it is compatible with the life chances of future generations, global development 
opportunities for all and preservation of a variety of life on this planet. This implies a system 
change, which will not be enforceable without resistance of persisting powers. Thus it is the more 
problematic that the forces that oppose neoliberalism, are facing a strategy problem. Social 
Democrats, the Greens and various left-wing parties often practice - although dissatisfied with the 
status quo - Realpolitik without an utopian horizon, which - since aimless - do not bring any 
significant structural changes. In civil society, however, it is not only a few who dream of the 
good life, yet without being interested in realpolitical transformations, and have to observe that 
"power-less" areas of life and business for creativity, subsistence and autonomy are increasingly 
being restricted in an authoritarian way. 
What is needed instead is a “as well as”-strategy - a "revolutionary Realpolitik" (Haug 2007) - 
improvements within the existing as well as long-term changes of institutions and structures.  
A great transformation of production and life is a hegemonic project that needs to clarify three 
key questions: Are there any design options and, if so, is there a will to implement? What kind of 
alliances are needed in Europe? What are the key starting points of this transformation? 
 3.1 The possibility and the will to shape society 
Every effective political project changes society. Great transformations are therefore primarily 
social revolutions, the change of routines, practices and attitudes that lead to new modes of life 
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and production. Therefore, the transformation of the capitalist mode of production must not be 
conceived as a "großer Wurf" (“big hit”) - attainable by a political revolution (Singer 1998: 11). 
Rather, it takes a variety of social innovation that experiment with the new. This is often 
triggered in self-organized spaces as capacity building and represents a social search movement. 
In addition to these social initiatives it essentially needs the crucial transformation of state 
institutions - hospitals and kindergartens, schools and railway, retirement homes and parks - into 
truly open and public facilities that are created by and for people. To ensure that all people can 
live well, it needs this transformation of the state into a community that enables access and 
participation for all. 
With this, Europe, a continent structurally geared to expansion would be posed with special 
challenges: it is necessary, to restrain the dynamics of expansion, growth and acceleration and 
increasingly appreciate and utilise what this continent has to offer in terms of resources and 
human skills. Such a strategy that draws more on sufficiency can learn from different approaches: 
from approaches inspired by dependency theory of "Self Reliance" and "auto-centered 
development" (Fischer 2013), but also from the current criticism of "expansive modernity" 
(Welzer 2013: 58) or neoliberal capitalism, in which social acceleration, continued activation and 
the inner land grabbing (Dörre et al 2009) prevail. This includes breaking with neoliberalism and 
simultaneously needs a utopian horizon: "objectively - historically it is time for ‘ripe’ capitalisms 
to proceed to a reproduction economy that is only growing on qualitative, high-technology paths" 
(Haug 2012: 338). 
After the weakening of global economic interdependence after 1914 and especially after the crisis 
of the 1930s, capitalist market economies were socially embedded, which was accompanied by 
ecological delimitation. In welfare capitalism control over money, budgeting and legislation was 
united in national container space, which is why political and economic space overlapped 
stronger. In Europe, this was due to the war and the broad-based consensus to never again repeat 
fascism. In the US similar processes already took place in the 1930s: A courageous President, the 
pressure of the people and the system competition with the Soviet Union allowed the New Deal - 
a policy of redistribution, of economic planning and capital controls. Especially the latter 
strengthened the national capacity to act, because it made capital flight difficult. Latin America 
also has a tradition of independent policy-making. Already since the 1950s Latin American 
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structuralism’s goals have been greater national room for manoeuvre by strengthening the 
internal market and import substitution. Commodity exports were supposed to lead to foreign 
exchange earnings, which enable autonomous industrialization. Over the past ten years there has 
by no means occurred a decoupling from the world market, but neo-extractivism emerged 
(FDCL/RLS 2012). In some areas, though room for manoeuvre was reclaimed. Examples include 
the end of the Dollar-peg, reduction of external debt and public access to natural resources. 
Above all, Argentina - in contrast to the current development in Southern Europe - was able to 
lift itself from the depression in a remarkably short time with the help of the violent act of change 
of government, devaluation and debt reduction. 
But this issue does not shape European intellectuals’ debate on political scope of design. In 
Europe, it is primarily about whether to "Europeanize or re-nationalize" and "euro exit or not." At 
this, the solution is usually seen in greater political integration (Beck 2012; Heise, 2013), in less 
nationalism and "more Europe" - a zero-sum game of national and European responsibility under 
constant political objectives. Yet the European specific is that political power remains fragmented 
in a “scalar mismatch” (2013 Martinelli/Novy: 311f). The solution approached in recent years is 
multi-level governance, where the EU Commission and the European Central Bank at the 
European level as well as heads of government and finance ministries at the national level make 
decisions isolated from public debates and access by parliamentary and other democratic 
participatory tools (Oberdorfer 2013). This strategy - without naming it as such - amounts to the 
formation of a new, increasingly authoritarian-led European power vessel, geographically 
comparable with the US, China, Russia and India. The implicit assumption being that the 
decisions taken under clear decision-making structures will be better (ones). Yet, given the 
current state structure in Europe, with its "strategic selectivity" (Jessop 2008) what is to be 
expected is mainly a solidification of neoliberal institutions and structures. 
Nevertheless there is room for shaping development within Europe at every level. Instead of an 
abridged discussion on which spatial level is "best" for progressive politics, it is important to 
utilize the respective capabilities of each policy level. At a superordinate level (Europe, nation) a 
suitable framework has to be specified, especially via monetary policy and a financial system that 
serve societal goals and are not solely focused on banking interests. Furthermore, it takes 
consistent action against monopolies and the freeing up of space for regional and democratic 
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experiments. As Keynes noted in 1933, civilization is liberation from economic constraints: 
"Once we allow ourselves to be disobedient to the test of accountant's profit, we have begun to 
change our civilization" (cited in Skidelsky/Skidelsky 2012: 218). Isn’t it about time for Europe, 
to learn from Latin American constitutional processes? Indeed, weren’t it necessary to replace the 
overall objectives of "competitiveness" and "austerity" by the constitutional goal of a good life 
for all? Although constitutions alone do not create any new realities, a significant shift in 
emphasis in dealing with the current crisis could be expected: to move away from subsidizing 
banks and towards concern for exploding unemployment and the increase in infant mortality and 
suicides. All this would not yet constitute the great transformation, but it would be the first step 
into transition (NEF 2010). 
From a realpolitical point of view the scepticism of Becker, Jäger and Weissenbacher (2013) 
regarding the practicability of a European progressive strategy is understandable: An eco-social 
change of course of the EU toward a mixed economy that doesn’t systematically promote 
privatization and liberalization, would necessitate radical changes of the European legal- and 
institutional framework similar to the changes nation-states experienced after 1918 and after 1945 
- in other words, after a long war and revolutionary upheavals. But history also knows of radical 
changes without war and devastation. In Europe system change occurred after 1989 without 
violence, and in Latin America no one expected an erosion of the 500-year-old "development of 
underdevelopment" in 1998. That is (exactly) why I set the pessimism of the intellect against the 
optimism of the will in the following section. 
 3.2 Broad Alliances 
One cannot deny the optimism of the search movement for a good life. A unifying bond amongst 
those who work on the good life is looking to the future: some tell several "counter-stories" of a 
new elite (Welzer 2013: 254), others remodel the "relations between reality and the symbolic 
order creatively in a new way" (Knecht et al. 2013) and (still) others are followers of buen vivir, 
of degrowth and the Commons movement. The enthusiasm for their own respective project is 
contrasted with a lack of interest in bringing the various initiatives together into one mosaic. It 
lacks a hegemonic project that does not only describe the goal - a society beyond neoliberalism - 
but also the joint steps into transition to this new order.  
 19 
 
Hegemony, meaning effective and lasting stabilization of a social order, is a project of power - 
"for a given society" and especially "against a certain order." It has to persuade, inspire and 
mobilize people (Gramsci 1994). But in order to be sustained and to be institutionalized, it always 
needs a change of government as well. In contrast to the past 30 years in Europe, this (change of 
government) would have to be accompanied by the will to change, because neoliberal elites do 
not step down voluntarily. They did not (do that) in Latin America, they will not do so in Europe. 
In order to break the power of the neoliberal elites, an alliance of social and political movements, 
trade unions and political parties is needed. In Latin America this was crucial in the fight against 
neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Leading by way of example is the Brazilian Landless 
Workers Movement, which maintained its autonomy from the state apparatus and political 
parties, but always sided with the reformist government in crucial moments (Stedile 2006; 
Loureiro/Novy 2012). The movement practices autonomy and solidarity. At the beginning of this 
century buen vivir was recognized to such an extent in the Andean region, that it was elevated to 
constitutional status in Bolivia and Ecuador by qualified majorities. 
But the Latin American example also shows the danger in this fight for change: In case of 
alienation of government and social movements, this jeopardizes the effectiveness of both. A 
recent example from Brazil is the mass mobilization against fare increases, which was partly 
successful but has on the other hand led to a massive loss of popularity of the ruling Workers' 
Party PT and has given neoliberals and conservatives hope that the current President Dilma 
Rousseff could be voted out of office in 2014. It is encouraging that Rousseff welcomed the 
demonstrations and supports the concerns of the movement, which are better public transport, 
better health care and quality education for all. In other countries, however, especially in 
Ecuador, it seems to have come to a permanent alienation of state and movement - and this is 
harming both. 
In Europe, the coalition of social and political movements is not the only one that is currently 
weak. The social basis of a left project is unclear as well. Left reformist policy can only be 
successful democratically with a coalition of middle and lower classes. In Europe, it is especially 
the Social Democrats and the Greens who only have a weak connection to the lower class (Walter 
2010a, 2010b). Yet in many parts of Europe, especially north-western Europe, the middle class is 
numerically still strong (Herrmann 2010). Halting neoliberal accumulation and upward-
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redistribution increase the middle class’ threat of relegation and exclusion. The crisis of the 
European model of production endangers the European way of life, as it has developed in the 
20th century: as consumerism, but also as welfare states. While the political right openly 
promotes strategies “for the few” as the answer and thus also practices an exclusionary approach 
to physical limits, the political left is characterized in part by a remarkable indifference to the 
fears of Europeans to descent socially, to their - on a world scale - ”suffering on a high level”. 
Real existing Europeans, however experience these developments ambivalently. They benefit 
particularly from cheap imports of consumer goods. But, they suffer from rising unemployment 
and cut welfare budgets. However, the middle class is no guaranteed alliance partner of a good 
life for all. Although much of the middle class owe their existence to a functioning welfare state, 
a part of them is supporting policy of those who own substantial assets, meaning, the top one 
percent and the top part per thousand (Herrmann 2010). Three examples about the good life 
illustrate the ambiguity of the middle class: Should they take a stand for good public schools or 
no longer be interested since their children already attend private schools? Should they support 
the expansion of public transport and cycling trails, even if it restricts the amenities of driving a 
car? Should they endorse property taxes and higher income tax progression? This is exactly 
where a search movement, creativity and reason is needed especially, so that the answers to these 
questions lead to solutions "for all".  
 3.3 Starting points for the Great Transformation  
The proposed hegemonic project is based on at least five pillars that can be implemented at 
different spatial levels in varying degrees of efficacy: first, and fundamentally it takes 
democratically negotiated priorities in a caring government based on the "nurturant parent 
model" (Lakoff 2008: 81). This includes ethical appraisal of different forms of consumption and 
production, without resorting to coercive economic planning (Skidelsky/Skidelsky 2012: 193). 
Because a democratic community does not only have the right but the duty to institutionalize a 
resource-saving, more regionalized mode of production and life. Democratic budgeting processes 
can support this by setting new priorities for the use of public funds and use innovative forms of 
participation and knowledge in the process (Leubolt et al. 2009). A democratic debate on how 
private wealth can be used for public functions is of crucial importance in Europe. 
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Second, it needs a new ecological-solidarian mode of production with ecologically sensitive high-
tech sectors, a new ecological infrastructure and the large area of care-economy. All these areas 
exhibit a strong or relatively strong tendency to socialization, small-scale regionality and 
participation and require massive public support: for coordination, planning and promotion of 
cooperation. This is not only true for the Internet and the knowledge economy, but also for the 
energy sector. Yet this potential for emancipation and holism is also always being monopolized 
by the state and capital - not only online. In this manner, renewable energy is provided both 
decentralized (as with a variety of models of civic power plants and energy cooperatives in 
Germany) and centralized by corporations (as in England and Spain) (Haas/Sander 2013). Also in 
the education and care sector municipal and public providers, voluntary work, solidarity economy 
and the third sector are operating parallel to purely commercial enterprises. It will be up to 
ingenious frameworks and strategic political alliances, whether these sunrise industries will be 
able to unfold their progressive potential "for a good life" and "for all". 
Third, it is about new modes of working. The Four-in-one perspective of Frigga Haug (2008) 
presents a feminist model of work, starting from a radical reduction in wage working hours and a 
new balance of working: spending four hours a day dedicated to gainful employment, four hours 
of social, political and individual work, i.e. activities for oneself. This revolutionizes the concept 
of performance, since ”top performers”, who are working 60-hours, turn out to be 
underperformers in this model when it comes to the care of the elderly, volunteering at the fire 
brigade or voluntary participation in NGOs and political parties. Care work is being socially 
appreciated, work is being distributed equally and is both meaningful and pleasurable. 
Fourth, good public infrastructure and public services in education, health, care, housing, public 
transport and public credit are needed. A high-quality reproduction economy includes a public 
supply of leisure activities, such as nature, sports and cultural activities that reduce the high 
financial and environmental costs of searching for recreation in distant locations. These services 
further include communally owned and publicly owned infrastructure companies, the extension 
of the Commons, local cooperative banks and public banks. 
Fifth, it is about an inversion of priority away from the neo-mercantilist external orientation, 
whose overall economic-political objective is to achieve export surpluses. This leads to social 
acceleration by constantly increasing competition, which leaves no time to deal with the ultimate 
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goal of development, precisely the good life. Strengthening and expanding the internal market 
and independence does not mean compartmentalization of the world market, but consciously 
designing Europe’s integration into the world market. A design that is accompanied by selective 
protection mechanisms, which strengthen ecologically and socially important industrial sectors 
and enable resource-efficient, small-scale and non-commercial modes of living and working. 
These mechanisms are primarily duties - that prevent social and environmental dumping by 
corporations - and capital controls. A regional circular economy does not emerge without 
political support. Selective design of world market integration whilst talking into account 
ecological limits represents the completion of the historic project of the democratically organized 
embedding of the economy in society and nature (Lipietz 1998). 
To focus on these tasks “at home”, would be Europe’s most important contribution to world 
development. This is already quite ambitious, as in its expansive history this continent has 
brought - in addition to technical and social progress - much suffering, war and exploitation to the 
rest of the world. Instead of fighting the declining importance in the global market with 
ineffective means it were about acknowledging the emergence of a truly multipolar world and 
about focusing our attention on tasks that arise here from affluence and inequality. In the best 
case solidarity and ecological alternatives for the good life in Europe and in the world could 
develop in a politically supported search process. Perhaps this way Europe will find a new role as 
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